The FN FAL Battle Rifle Page 6

  North Borneo, during the

  For British and Commonwealth troops involved in the Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation, 1966.

  The original walnut furniture of

  great stress was placed on marksmanship. The Anti-Terrorist Operations the L1A1 was eventually replaced in Malaya (ATOM) manual The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in by a lighter, waterproof composite Malaya covered in detail the tactics of jungle warfare, yet always came stock. (IWM FEW-66-27-35) back to good shooting as a prerequisite: ‘The best plan, the best leadership, and the most skilful fieldcraft will avail nothing if the men cannot shoot to kill when they meet the CT’ (British Army 1958: 15/2). Civil actions, amnesties, the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ and the August 1957

  establishment of Malaya as an independent nation combined to make the British response to the Emergency successful. The military side of operations in Malaya was a war of a thousand cuts, and the Commonwealth forces inflicted the vast majority of them.

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  The British in the Middle East

  In the Middle East, the L1A1 proved an ideal weapon. In places like Oman, Aden and Dhofar, where the terrain was wide open and cover scarce, long range and accuracy were needed in a service rifle. Local tribesmen were, initially at least, armed with elderly British rifles such as the accurate, hard-hitting .303in Lee-Enfield, and in some cases even the old single-shot black-powder .577/450 Martini-Henry was still in use. The tribesmen who wielded them, however, had practically grown up with these rifles in their hands and were often crack marksmen.

  Operating against Saudi-backed rebels in the barren mountain massif of the Jebel Akhdar in Muscat and Oman in 1957–59, SAS troopers found using grenade launchers and the Energa on their L1A1s quite effective.

  When fired into a cave or thick mud-walled building occupied by insurgents, the sheer concussion of the blast contained within an enclosed area proved devastating. (Dewar 1987: 83–93)

  One startling example of the value of the semi-automatic L1A1’s ammunition conservation comes from the Aden Emergency (1963–67), where British forces fought a tough battle in what would become South Yemen even as the politicians were backing out of the protectorate. Soviet-made arms were being smuggled to the rebels via the rugged, rocky and nearly waterless Radfan Mountains, across terrain not unlike parts of Afghanistan.

  The Edwards Patrol in April 1964 involved nine men from No. 3

  High in the mountains of South

  Arabia, an SLR-armed sentry from

  Troop SAS infiltrating into enemy-occupied mountains to mark out a the Coldstream Guards maintains

  drop zone for a landing by the Paras in the middle of the rebels’ supposedly a watch on the wadi below. The

  secure backyard. Achieving the right balance between mobility and range and power of the L1A1

  firepower is always a nagging problem for infantry. In the dry desert proved its worth in the Aden

  campaigns. (IWM R 35178)

  wastes of the rugged, burning Radfan, water was a vital necessity even more important than bullets. With

  water weighing 3.6kg (8lb) to the

  gallon, each man had to carry

  approximately 7.3kg (16lb) of the

  precious commodity.

  Since Intelligence reports

  insisted that the patrol would be

  unlikely to encounter much enemy

  resistance and should be able to

  steal past the rebels without

  engaging in any real fighting,

  weight was saved in the ammunition

  department. Each man carried four

  spare magazines of 7.62×51mm

  NATO for his L1A1 (80 rounds),

  plus a 50-round bandolier of the

  same in his pack, as well as some

  extra .303in ammunition for the

  patrol’s single Bren LMG. It was

  stressed that ammunition must be

  conserved jealously and spent

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  wisely and effectively.

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  Captain Robin Edwards’

  patrol encountered problems

  from the beginning. As they

  moved through the mountains, it

  soon became clear that the

  radioman was suffering from

  food poisoning and unable to

  keep pace. Thus, dawn found the

  SAS men far from their

  destination and they were forced

  to take cover for the day in a

  couple of old enemy sangars,

  fighting positions made from

  piled stones on rocky ground that

  did not allow digging. As fate

  would have it, the men’s hiding

  place was discovered by a

  goatherd in an incident eerily

  similar to the problem

  encountered by SAS team Bravo

  Two Zero during the First Gulf

  War. Local tribesmen were alerted

  and rushed to the scene from all

  directions, resulting in a day-long sniping duel between the jihadists and A Sterling-armed Royal Anglian the SAS men. The troopers husbanded every round, shooting carefully.

  dog handler and his Alsatian

  Air support, in the form of Hawker Hunter ground-attack aircraft of with a patrol of L1A1-armed soldiers in the mountains of South

  the Royal Air Force (RAF), came to the patrol’s aid during the day and Arabia. The Sterling provided suppressed the tribesmen. As darkness fell, however, the air support was a full-automatic, short-range unable to continue. By then, the patrol’s radioman had been killed; all of complement to the semi-the men were wounded to one degree or another, some severely, since in automatic, long-range fire of the SLR. (IWM TR 24800)

  the rocks of the sangar even near-misses from rifle bullets sprayed them with rock and lead fragments.

  Knowing the rebels would try to overrun the patrol under the cloak of night, Captain Edwards led the break-out and escape of the SAS patrol in the darkness. He was killed in the attempt as the tribesmen, seeing their quarry escaping, swarmed after the patrol. The seven wounded survivors managed to make their way back towards British-controlled lines through the forbidding terrain. An Arab tracker and three other tribesmen were detected following the patrol’s trail, and two SAS men hung back and hit the Arabs with a hasty ambush, cutting down all four with their L1A1s.

  Later in the night, another pair of guerrillas found and followed the patrol; they were killed in a repeat of the first ambush.

  Eventually, just after daybreak, the battered and bloody survivors encountered a British armoured car, which took the two most severely wounded back to base while the last five marched home. Despite the long ordeal, day-long firefight, and two ambushes, none of the men had run completely out of ammunition. Casualties among the enemy were

  unknown, but must have been quite extensive. That such a small group survived at all amidst many hundreds of angry guerrillas was amazing.

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  Although the majority of the patrol survived this epic encounter, any good to come of it was marred when the rebels desecrated the bodies of the captain and the signaller and paraded through the streets displaying their severed heads; shades of US Army helicopter pilots in Mogadishu three decades later.

  One cannot help but compare the Edwards Patrol to a more recent incident, in September 2006. Task Force 31, consisting of a company of American Special Forces and the Afghan commandos they were training, all armed with full-automatic weapons, were engaged in a firefight with insurgents. After only 20 minutes they had expended nearly all of their ammunition and were forced to break contact to resupply by helicopter.

  (Helicopters cannot always be available at one’s beck and call for ammunition resupply, however; somet
hing the British found out in the Falklands.) On 17 June 1967, only nine days before the British withdrew from Aden, No. 9 Troop of 45 Commando of the Royal Marines, again armed with L1A1s and a single Bren gun, had a skirmish with a handful of guerrillas. As David Young, historian of 45 Commando, recalled: We leapt out of the choppers, having placed our piquets – in case they tried to run away – and as we got out we saw the three men dashing up a low hill about 200 yards away. One stopped and fired at us. We were right out in the open and as there was such a din going on, I blew my whistle and told the lads to adopt a kneeling position for firing. This they did and two dissidents were killed outright, a great achievement as it is a most difficult position to fire from. The third ran over the crest of a hill and slap into the piquet commanded by Cpl. McLaughlin and was shot at 30 yds range. Throughout the entire engagement, only 80

  rounds were expended … (Quoted in Geraghty 1982: 93)

  Although completely unheralded by the press at the time, the battle of Mirbat on 18 July 1972 in South Oman was an epic last stand in the mould of Rorke’s Drift or the Alamo. The ancient mud-walled forts of the town were garrisoned by nine SAS troopers acting as a training cadre for local troops, who were armed with a mish-mash of FN FALs, L1A1s and

  .303in Lee-Enfield bolt-action rifles. Other than these small arms, the only heavy weapons were a single Browning .50-calibre machine gun, a single 81mm mortar, and a World War II-vintage 25-pdr gun.

  Surrounding the isolated post in the darkness came over 250 Marxist guerrillas, the best of the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), well armed with the latest Soviet and Chinese weapons, from AK-47s to 82mm mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Outgunned and outnumbered more than five to one, the Omani and British forces responded magnificently to the guerrillas’ attack. With so few heavy weapons, the defenders found that their SLRs and FALs played an important part in fending off the assault.

  Atop their ‘team house’, the SAS troopers fought back:

  Another of his [Captain ‘Mike’ Kealy’s] soldiers, Trooper W., opened up with the Browning, raking the area between the two forts, while 38

  others, firing from the roof of the BATThouse [headquarters of the

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  British Army Training Team],

  picked off targets with careful

  precision with FN automatic rifles

  and a light machine gun.

  Throughout the confusion,

  Corporal B. calmly indicated

  targets for the SAS mortar, the

  Browning, and light machine-guns,

  using lines of tracer to emphasize

  his fire orders. He also picked off

  leading guerrillas with his own

  rifle. (Geraghty 1982: 145)

  The most amazing story of the battle

  involved Sergeant Talaisi Labalaba,

  a broad-shouldered Fijian trooper

  with massive strength. He manned

  the isolated 25-pdr gun, doing the

  job of an artillery crew alone. As the

  Adoo guerrillas closed, Sergeant

  Labalaba was actually aiming down

  the bore of the artillery piece before

  slamming home a shell and firing.

  All of his mates attributed their

  success in holding the post to his

  single-handed stand with the 25-pdr.

  He was finally killed in action at the

  25-pdr, and yet was awarded only a

  posthumous Mention in Dispatches

  when many felt he had earned the

  Victoria Cross. At the time, however,

  the British government did not wish the public to know of British soldiers Armed with L1A1s, two lance-involved in direct combat in Oman and the incident was hushed up.

  corporals of the Parachute

  Eventually, the thick, low cloud ceiling cleared just enough for Omani Regiment in Aden outside the charred remains of a Jewish

  jet aircraft to strafe the rebels and for helicopters to land SAS synagogue, which was set on fire reinforcements. The guerrillas broke off their attack, leaving casualties during rioting in 1965. (IWM ADN

  and large amounts of new Soviet-made equipment across the battlefield. 65-513-6) The battle effectively broke the back of the DLF.

  Nearly 25 years later at the dawn of a new century, the Omani Army was newly re-equipped with Steyr AUG bullpup assault rifles in 5.56×45mm. It did not take a new generation of guerrillas long to determine the limitations of the 5.56mm round. Omani Jeep and Land Rover patrols soon found themselves being engaged from long range by tribesmen with Lee-Enfields. Disabling the vehicles with the powerful

  .303in British rounds, the guerrillas could then pick off the soldiers at their leisure from beyond the effective range of the troops’ AUGs. The AUGs were eventually transferred to rear-echelon security troops and the field troops were re-equipped with the ‘old’ H&K G3 battle rifle in 7.62×51mm.

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  Troops of 1 Para on patrol in

  The Troubles

  Cupar Street, Belfast in August

  The so-called ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland were a thankless no-win 1969, armed with walnut-stocked

  situation for all involved, not least the British soldiers sent there in 1969

  L1A1 SLRs.

  to keep the peace. Well before the US Marine Corps came up with the (IWM TR 32986)

  phrase ‘Strategic Corporal’, at least one British officer called internal-security operations in Northern Ireland the ‘Corporal’s War’1. As with other lessons learned and relearned in urban warfare, the situation in Belfast and elsewhere called for precise individual marksmanship rather than massed overwhelming firepower and supporting arms, a fact which sadly was learned once more in places like Baghdad, Fallujah and even Kabul. The 4× SUIT scope was developed in part to help soldiers in Northern Ireland with target identification as well as accuracy, as the following commentary noted:

  Shooting incidents are likely to occur when they are least expected.

  Reaction, which must be immediate and automatic, requires the fourth attribute of good internal security operations, the skilful and proper use of personal weapons. Accuracy of returned fire is essential; only too often, the target is a fleeting one and may be masked by women and children. Single shot is normally used, and all must be carefully aimed. Telescopic and night sights are issued, but the principal reliance is placed upon individual competence. Even infantry units have to relearn their traditional skills as marksmen on the classification ranges before being assigned to Northern Ireland. (Dodd 1976: 58)

  This tradition of good shooting would stand the British Army in good stead in other places, especially the Falkland Islands, and the SLR was able to deliver what was required.

  1 That is, due to the increasingly complex, urbanized and politicized nature of war, junior non-commissioned officers may find themselves making small-unit military decisions which can have 40

  global repercussions.

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  THE FAL IN AFRICA

  The Congo crisis

  For many, the FN FAL made its

  debut on the world stage by

  appearing in photographs and film

  footage of the fighting in the former

  Belgian Congo. Many former

  European colonies in Africa, upon

  gaining their independence,

  degenerated into chaos and tribal

  warfare. Into this mix was added

  communism, which became a

  powerful force as various communist

  countries sent huge amounts of

  armaments – and advisors – to the

  largest groups of guerrillas.

  In 1964, communist-backed

  guerrillas calling themselves Simbas

  took over large parts of the Congo
>
  from the fledgling nationalist

  government under Moïse Tshombe

  (1919–69). The Simbas killed off the

  intelligentsia and committed many

  other atrocities as well, especially

  involving European mission

  workers, including nuns. In the town

  of Stanleyville (now Kisangani), the

  Simbas took a large number of

  civilians hostage; these were mainly white Europeans but also included A Congolese soldier resting in some Congolese friendly to the government.

  the bush, 1961. He is armed

  Due to the ongoing bloodshed and the fear that the hostages would be with a Belgian FN FAL. (Photo by Terrence Spencer/Time Life

  executed, a rescue mission was planned, Operation Dragon Rouge, Pictures/Getty Images) involving the crack Belgian troops of the 1er Régiment de Para-Commando.

  The Belgian Air Force was, at the time, equipped with American-made Fairchild C-119G ‘Flying Boxcars’ and it was found that the extensive length of the standard FAL rifle could prove difficult for paratroops exiting the aircraft. In early 1964, the Régiment Para-Commando had begun to receive a new weapon, a modified FAL with a folding stock to make it more compact. Not all para-commandos were equipped with the new weapon, but its initial use in Operation Dragon Rouge would lead to it forever being referred to as the ‘Para’ or ‘Congo’ FAL.

  At 0400hrs on 24 November 1964, some 350 para-commandos made

  a ‘hot’ (opposed) parachute drop onto Stanleyville airport. Within 40

  minutes they had secured the airfield and removed obstacles from the runway. This enabled the five US Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft carrying more Belgian troops to land at the airfield. No fewer than five rebel counter-attacks were beaten off by the para-commandos at the airfield, while another advance group fought its way into Stanleyville proper.

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  On the ground, Congolese troops and a band of mostly white mercenaries known as 5 Commando was likewise rushing towards

  Stanleyville. These were the troops of colourful Irish soldier-of-fortune Colonel ‘Mad Mike’ Hoare, hired by Tshombe. The first action of the mercenaries had proven near disastrous, as some of Hoare’s men were not the fully trained veteran soldiers they claimed to be.